

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 03329 01 OF 03 011515Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----124100 011518Z /50

O 011440Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1741
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 ANKARA 3329

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY, TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS

REF: ANKARA 3328

1. OKCUN CALLED ME BACK THIS AFTERNOON TO GIVE ME TURKISH REACTION TO OUR SUGGESTED PARAGRAPHS FOR DEPSEC CHRISTOPHER'S MAY 2 STATEMENT IN SENATE HEARINGS. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DCM AND HE WAS AGAIN ACCOMPANIED BY HALUK OZGUL.

2. OKCUN SAID THAT GOT HAD STUDIED OUR PROPOSALS AND WISHED TO SUGGEST A DIFFERENT APPROACH. HE THEN HANDED ME THE FOLLOWING PAPER:
QTE: THE SUGGESTED STATE DEPARTMENT APPROACH TO CONGRESSIONAL DISCUSSIONS IS OF A NATURE THAT WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS QUESTION IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT, SO LONG AS THIS OPPORTUNITY IS AVAILABLE TO THE GREEKS CYPRIOTS, THEY WILL TEND TO DECLINE FROM ACCEPTING THE RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND LEAVE THE MATTER TO THE U.S. CONGRESS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ANKARA 03329 01 OF 03 011515Z

BECAUSE WHEN TAKEN UP AT THE U.S. CONGRESS, RATHER THAN IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, THE PROBLEM WILL BE TURNED INTO A TOPIC OF BARGAINING BETWEEN THE U.S. CONGRESS AND TURKEY-VIA THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT-RATHER THAN REMAIN A TOPIC TO BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE PROPER PARTIES--THAT IS, THE TURKISH AND GREEK CYPRIOTS. THE GREEKS WILL REGARD IT AS MUCH MORE ADVANTAGEOUS BECAUSE THE EMBARGO PRESSURE OVER TURKEY

WILL BE FULLY AND DIRECTLY UTILIZED AND MANIPULATED. THE GREEK SIDE WILL NO MORE BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A PARTY TO THE PROBLEM BUT WILL CHOOSE TO BE A PROVOCATIVE SPECTATOR. THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, IN THAT CASE, WILL BE INTERNATIONALIZED AND WILL BECOME INSOLUBLE, WITH ITS UNAVOIDABLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES ON TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS, ON RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE, ON NATO, AS WELL AS ON CYPRUS ITSELF.

THE SUGGESTED STATE DEPARTMENT APPROACH TO CONGRESSIONAL DISCUSSIONS EXPECTS, IN EFFECT, THE TURKISH SIDE TO BE ENGAGED IN A PRE-NEGOTIATION' PROCESS, IN WHICH THE GREEK SIDE, THROUGH THE U.S., WOULD FORCE TURKEY TO PUT PRESSURE UPON THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO CHANGE THEIR DECLARED NEGOTIATING POSITION EVEN BEFORE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS START, SO THAT THEY MAY BE IN A MUCH BETTER BARGAINING POSITION WHEN AND IF THE TALKS START, HAVING OBTAINED, EVEN BEFORE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, MOST OF THEIR OBJECTIVES AND THEY WILL FEEL ENTITLED TO ASK FOR MORE.

THE PRESENT TURKISH GOVERNMENT, WITH ITS KNOWN INTERNAL PROBLEMS, HAS ALREADY TAKEN OVER TOO MUCH POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS REACHED THE LIMITS OF ITS FIELD OF ACTION. THE RESPONSIBILITY UNDERTAKEN BY THE PRESENT TURKISH GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE MINIMIZED IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT WAIT FOR THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO BEFORE ENCOURAGING THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO COME OUT WITH CONCRETE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROPOSALS. THERE ARE ALSO LIMITS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ANKARA 03329 01 OF 03 011515Z

TO THE DEGREE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT CAN INFLUENCE THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION, WHICH IS ALSO FACED WITH GREAT INTERNAL PROBLEMS.

IF THE GREEKS NOTICE THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS ARE WAVERING, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO ADOPT AN INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE EVEN IF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT NEGOTIATING POSITION IS TO BE CHANGED. THE HESITATION AND THE OVER-INVOLVEMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS HAS ALREADY STARTED SHOWING ITS NEGATIVE EFFECTS:

--BY ENCOURAGING THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO ADOPT AN AN INCREASINGLY INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE, AND
-- BY ENCOURAGING THE ATHENS GOVERNMENT TO POSTPONE INDEFINITELY THE HIGH-LEVEL TECHNICAL TALKS BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE THAT WERE DECIDED IN MONTREUX, THEREBY DAMAGING THE DIALOGUE THAT WAS INITIATED BETWEEN THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 03329 02 OF 03 011532Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----124194 011533Z /46

O 011440Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1742
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 ANKARA 3329

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

WE WOULD INSIST THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION SHOULD
REFRAIN FROM ADOPTING A LINE, DURING THE CONGRESSIONAL
DISCUSSIONS, WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO INDICATING:

-- THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT NEGOTIATING POSITION
HAS BEEN OR COULD BE CHANGED;
-- OR THAT THE TURKISH SIDE WAS READY TO RELINQUISH
SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN SHE IS, IN EFFECT,
PREPARED OR ABLE TO;
-- THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION ITSELF CONSIDERS THE
CYPRUS ISSUE AS INEXTRICABLE LINKED WITH THE EMBARGO.
THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION SHOULD ALSO SEE TO IT THAT
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM SHOULD NOT BECOME A
TOPIC OF DISCUSSION IN THE U.S. CONGRESS, FOR, OBVIOUSLY,
THAT IS NOT THE RIGHT FLOOR FOR SUCH A PROBLEM
TO BE TAKEN UP IN DETAIL AND IT WOULD ONLY RESULT IN
AGGRAVATING, NOT ONLY THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, BUT ALSO
THE TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION
COULD AND SHOULD STRESS THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ANKARA 03329 02 OF 03 011532Z

-- THE TURKISH SIDE HAS SHOWN ITS GOODWILL AND
UNDERTAKEN GREAT POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY BY
TAKING CONCRETE AND SUBSTANTIAL STEPS FOR THE
SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, BEFORE WAITING

FOR THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO;

- TURKEY HAS GIVEN AN ADDED PROOF OF HER GOODWILL BY WITHDRAWING MORE TROOPS FROM CYPRUS EVEN AFTER THE GREEKS INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT CONSENT TO SIT AROUND THE TABLE FOR INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS;
 - IT HAS BEEN OPENLY STATED THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS CONSTITUTE A "NEGOTIATING POSITION", INDICATING THAT THE TURKS ARE NOT RIGID BUT ARE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE DURING THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS;
 - THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS TESTIFY TO THE CYPRIOT TURKS SERIOUS INTENTION OF SETTING UP A REAL AND EFFECTIVE FEDERATION FROM THE BEGINNING -- A FEDERATION WHICH COULD EVOLVE WITH TIME INTO AN EVEN MORE CLOSELY-KNIT PATTERN OF COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP;
 - IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE TURKISH SIDE HAS MADE AN IMPORTANT GESTURE OF GOODWILL BY EXPRESSING ITS READINESS TO ALLOW SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF GREEKS TO SETTLE IN VAROSHA WHICH IS ECONOMICALLY THE MOST IMPORTANT AND REWARDING PLACE ON THE ISLAND;
 - IT IS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS ARE NOT RIGID ABOUT THE POLITICAL STATUS OF VAROSHA AND ARE OPEN TO CONSIDER VARIOUS ALTERNATIVE FORMULAS ONCE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ARE RESUMED;
 - THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ARE VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON BETWEEN DENKTASH AND
- SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ANKARA 03329 02 OF 03 011532Z

THE LATE MAKARIOS ON 12TH FEBRUARY 1977 AND INTERPRET THESE PRINCIPLES IN A RATHER CONSTRUCTIVE AND GENEROUS WAY WHICH SHOWS THAT THE TURKISH SIDE IS CONSISTENT;

- IF THE CONGRESS SEEMS RELUCTANT TO LIFT THE EMBARGO, THE GREEKS WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO ADOPT AN INCREASINGLY MORE TRANSIGENT ATTITUDE AND WILL DECLINE TO RECIPROCATATE THE WELL-INTENTIONED ADVANCES MADE BY THE TURKISH SIDE, AS A RESULT OF WHICH A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOLVING THE CYPRUS ISSUE WOULD BE MISSED, THE POSSIBILITY OF A RAPPROCHMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE WOULD BE LOST AND THE TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS AS WELL AS THE SOUTHEASTERN WING OF NATO COULD BECOME IRREPARABLY DAMAGED.

IT SHOULD ALSO BE IMPRESSED UPON MR. WALDHEIM THAT HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO DECLINE FROM CALLING FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, PARTICULARLY

AFTER HE ADMITTED THAT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS WERE "CONCRETE AND SUBSTANTIAL", AS THIS WOULD PUT HIM IN THE POSITION OF AN ARBITER (AND A BIASED ONE)-- A POSITION THAT WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS GOOD-OFFICES FUNCTION. IF HE DOES DECLINE, WE WILL SHARE A GREAT PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS THAT MAY TAKE PLACE IN THE FUTURE, NOT ONLY WITH REGARD TO CYPRUS, BUT ALSO WITH REGARD TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE AND TURKEY AND THE U.S.

THE SITUATION THAT WE ARE FACED WITH AT THIS STAGE, RESEMBLES THE UNFORTUNATE SITUATION THAT WE HAD BEEN FACED WITH YEARS AGO IN CONNECTION WITH THE "DEAN ACHESON FORMULA":

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 03329 03 OF 03 011523Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----124153 011527Z /46

O 011440Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1743
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 ANKARA 3329

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION, HAVING OBTAINED THE CONSENT OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT FOR THAT FORMULA, RETREATED FROM ITS OWN POSITION WHEN THE GREEKS REJECTED IT. THE U.S. THEN CAME FORTH WITH ANOTHER "DEAN ACHESON FORMULA" WHICH WAS CONSIDERABLY LESS ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THE TURKS THEN THE FIRST ONE. THE TURKISH SIDE ACCEPTED EVEN THE SECOND PROPOSAL IN GOOD FAITH BUT THE U.S. AGAIN RETREATED UNDER GREEK PRESSURE. ALL THESE UNFORTUNATE DEVELOPMENTS, AT THAT TIME, CREATED A SERIOUS CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN TURKEY VIS-A-VIS TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND RESULTED IN A PROLONGATION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IN INCREASINGLY AGGRAVATED FORM

THROUGH THE YEARS, WHICH EVENTUALLY LED TO THE DEVELOPMENTS THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE SUMMER OF 1974.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT A SIMILAR U.S. APPROACH NOW WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT PRODUCE ANY BETTER RESULTS. UNQTE

3. AFTER STUDYING PAPER, I TOLD OKCUN THAT TURKISH RESPONSE WOULD BE VIEWED WITH GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT IN WASHINGTON. I COULD SEE ONLY TWO POSITIVE ELEMENTS:

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ANKARA 03329 03 OF 03 011523Z

THE STATEMENT THAT THE TURK NEGOTIATING POSITION WAS NOT RIGID AND THEY WERE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE; AND THE STATEMENT THAT TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT BE RIGID ABOUT FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF VAROSHA. I COMMENTED THAT THE TURKS WERE IGNORING THE REAL CONDITIONS IN THE CONGRESS WHERE THE ADMINISTRATION WAS ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE PEOPLE TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS, NO MATTER WHAT THE TURKS THOUGHT ABOUT IT THOSE PEOPLE WHO WERE BEING ASKED TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS DID CONNECT CYPRUS AND THE EMBARGO. I SAID THAT I WOULD TRANSMIT THE TURKISH PAPER TO WASHINGTON AND THEN COMMENTED THAT AT SOME POINT THERE WOULD BE GREAT PRESSURE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO STATE ITS VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. I AM REPORTING THAT PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION SEPTTEL.

4. LATER OZGUL TELEPHONED FROM FONMINISTRY TO CALL OUR ATTENTION TO PARA IN PAPER CITING MARKARIOS-DENKTASH AGREEMENT OF PRINCIPLES. HE SAID OKCUN BELIEVED WE SHOULD STRESS THIS AGREEMENT IN OUR PRESENTATION TO CONGRESS. OZGUL SUBSEQUENTLY SUPPLIED FOLLOWING TEXT OF AGREEMENT:

QTE 12 FEB 1977 DENKTASH-MAKARIOS AGREEMENT

DURING OUR TALKS, WHICH LASTED FOR FOUR HOURS, INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT FOR THE REPRESENTATIVES IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AS THE BASIS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

IT HAS ALSO BEEN AGREED TO RECONVENE THE CYPRUS TALKS IN VIENNA UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETRAY GENERAL AT THE END OF MARCH.

THE TEXT OF THE AGREED INSTRUCTIONS (GUIDELINES)
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ANKARA 03329 03 OF 03 011523Z

REFERRED TO IN THE ABOVE COMMUNIQUE READS AS FOLLOWS:

1- WE ARE SEEKING AN INDEPENDENT, NON-ALIGNED,
BI-COMMUNAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC.

2- THE TERRITORY UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF
EACH COMMUNITY SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE LIGHT OF
ECONOMIC VIABILITY OR PRODUCTIVITY AND LAND OWNERSHIP.

3- QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLES LIKE FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT, FREEDOM OF SETTLEMENT, THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY
AND OTHER SPECIFIC MATTERS, ARE OPEN FOR DISCUSSION TAKING
INTO CONSIDERATION THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF A BI-
COMMUNAL FEDERAL SYSTEM AND CERTAIN PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES
WHICH MAY ARISE FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY.

4- THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT WILL BE SUCH AS TO SAFEGUARD THE UNITY OF
THE COUNTRY, HAVING REGARD TO THE BI-COMMUNAL CHARACTER
OF THE STATE. UNQTE

5. COMMENT: TURK RESPONSE CONTAINED IN TEXT
IS VERY HARD AND DOES NOT RESPOND TO THE SPIRIT
OF OUR REQUEST, I.E. THAT WE HAD A COMMON PROBLEM AND
WERE SOLICITING TURKISH COOPERATION IN SOLVING IT. THE
PAPER ALSO ILLUSTRATES THE DEPTH OF OUR PROBLEM: THE TURKS
DO NOT TRUST US AND ARE NOT YET FULLY CONVINCED THAT
WE ARE TRYING IN GOOD FAITH TO GET THE EMBARGO RAISED.
THEY CONTINUE TO BELIEVE (AT LEAST HALF WAY) THAT
WE ARE ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE GREEKS.
SPIERS

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, POLICIES, CAT-B, NEGOTIATIONS, TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, EMBARGOES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 may 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978ANKARA03329
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS
Executive Order: OA
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P850101-2050, N780004-0736
Format: TEL
From: ANKARA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197805107/aaaadnah.tel
Line Count: 360
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 53b8a494-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS, EXDIS
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS, EXDIS
Reference: 78 ANKARA 3328
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2534068
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY, TU, US
To: STATE ATHENS MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/53b8a494-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014